FLG takes two passages from popular security blogs and translates them into plain language:

Before:

In densely populated urban areas WiFi routers form a tightly interconnected proximity network that can be exploited as a substrate for the spreading of malware able to launch massive fraudulent attacks. In this article, we consider several scenarios for the deployment of malware that spreads over the wireless channel of major urban areas in the US. We develop an epidemiological model that takes into consideration prevalent security flaws on these routers. The spread of such a contagion is simulated on real-world data for georeferenced wireless routers. We uncover a major weakness of WiFi networks in that most of the simulated scenarios show tens of thousands of routers infected in as little as 2 weeks, with the majority of the infections occurring in the first 24–48 h. We indicate possible containment and prevention measures and provide computational estimates for the rate of encrypted routers that would stop the spreading of the epidemics by placing the system below the percolation threshold.

After:

Wireless routers are packed in so tight in cities that writers of computer virii and other nefarious programs may be able to use them as a way to cause massive attacks. In this article, we consider several scenarios of how this may occur. We simulated the spread of computer virii using data gathered about the real-world locations of wireless routers. The simulations show tens of thousands of routers infected in as little as 2 weeks, with the majority of the infections occurring in the first 24–48 h. This is a major weakness of WiFi networks. We recommend ways to prevent this, and provide an educated guess at the percentage of encrypted routers, which are vaccinated if you will, that would stop the spreading of the epidemics.

(Source)

Before:

American airpower is often hailed by its proponents as our “asymmetric advantage.” It’s indisputable that largely undisputed control of the air and more accurate and damaging bombs do give us an important advantage. But, as Danger Room blogs, this perception is causing problems in counterinsurgency:

“Afghans are well aware that bullets and bombs go astray. But there’s a sense that airstrikes — especially American airstrikes — are always eye-of-the-needle accurate. Which means that so-called collateral damage isn’t viewed as an error. It’s seen as a deliberate hit on civilians.”

This isn’t solely a problem in Afghanistan. There is a common perception–fed no doubt by TV footage of the Gulf War, Kosovo, and “Shock and Awe” that Air Force targeting is scientific. If a bomb hits a civilian target, it was a deliberate strike. In the Kosovo conflict, the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy was taken as evidence of an nefarious American plot.

After:

Problems Caused By Badass American Fighter Jocks:

American pilots and planes are so fucking badass that nobody can touch them. Undoubtedly, they are badass and that helps a lot but, as Danger Room blogs, this screws us up when trying to fight terrorists and other bad guys:

“Afghans are well aware that bullets and bombs go astray. But there’s a sense that airstrikes — especially American airstrikes — are dead-on-balls accurate. Which means nobody believes us when we say that we blew stuff up or killed people by accident.

This isn’t solely a problem in Afghanistan. People around the world think — largely because the Air Force loves to show how cool its planes and bombs are on TV — that the Air Force can blow up exactly what it wants and nothing else. Because of this, if we fuck up, then everybody thinks it’s on purpose. In the Kosovo conflict, when we blew the Godless, Communist Chinese embassy to smithereens it was taken as evidence of an nefarious American plot.

(Source)